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This paper tests for one mechanism that can explain the existence of a language 
barrier to trade. Specifically, I ask if those industries that require more cross-border 
communication in order to export their products trade more between Canadian 
provinces that know the other's language(s). I find that trade in industries with a 
need to communicate directly (orally) with importers increases with the 
probability that people in another province speak the same language. This 
finding can fill a missing link in the empirical trade literature, which lacked 
convincing arguments for the observed correlation between language 
commonality and the total volume of trade. 
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In the light of falling tari®s and transport cost, the importance of institutional barriers to trade
has captured much attention in recent research.1 The existence of a language barrier in trade
has been documented in numerous empirical studies. Rose (2000) ¯nds that countries sharing
a common language trade 1.5 times more with each other. Anderson and van Windcoop
(2004) estimate that the tax equivalent of the language barrier amounts to seven percent.
While gravity models of aggregate trade °ows ¯nd robust evidence for the language
barrier, these models remain silent on the question of the channel through which language
a®ects trade. From a logical point of view, it is even questionable if language should a®ect
international trade at all, given that international trade °ows consist mainly of manufactures.
For instance, in order to trade two manufacturing goods between the US and China only
one translator is required, whose services are unlikely to a®ect total trading cost. Also the
fact that with China and Japan two countries with relatively few °uent English speakers are
among the top ¯ve trading nations contradicts the importance of language for manufacturing
trade. Services trade, on the other hand, often requires the ability of both the service provider
and his customer to communicate directly with each other.
A second shortcoming of the studies mentioned above is their opaque measurement of
the language barrier. It is typically represented as either a binary indicator for countries
that share a common o±cial language (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 2002), or as the probability
that two randomly chosen people from two countries share a common mother tongue (e.g.
Melitz, 2008). Alternatively, Hutchinson (2002) and Ku and Zussman (2008) suggest to use
the °uency in English - the lingua franca of international trade - as a proxy for the ability of
natives from two countries to communicate in a common third language. These measures do
indeed all re°ect some aspect of the potential language barrier. Yet what is really required
for trade is that there is a su±cient number of people in both countries who are pro¯cient in
at least one of the other's language(s), irrespective of whether they speak a lingua franca, the
same o±cial, native, or second language. Also, the common proxies might take up all other
kinds of bilateral institutional similarities, thereby imposing an upward bias on the estimate
for the language barrier in gravity models.
This paper wants to provide one way to resolve the missing motivation of the language
barrier and to reduce measurement bias of the e®ect of language on trade. In particular,
I test if communication-intensive industries trade more between Canadian provinces with a
good knowledge of the other's language(s) compared to those industries that require less
communication with the trading partner. Such a ¯nding could justify the alleged role of
language as a trade barrier. Though it is less general than conventional gravity models, this
1Recent examples are Rauch (2002), Nunn (2007), and Levchenko (2007).
1simple approach has two advantages: First, it tests for one speci¯c mechanism through which
language a®ects trade. Second, it corrects for other institutional factors that could bias the
estimates via ¯xed-bilateral e®ects between Canadian provinces.
Previous work that comes closest to this paper is from Fink et al. (2005), who show that
trade is signi¯cantly lower between countries with high bilateral international calling prices.
They ¯nd that the price e®ect is larger for trade in di®erentiated products compared to
goods that are traded over organized exchanges, which corroborates the hypothesis that trade
in communication-intensive goods is more sensitive to de¯ciencies in direct communication.
However, they estimate that halving the importer's calling prices would boost aggregate trade
by 42.5%, which seems unreasonably high. Melitz (2008) uses several measures of language
commonality to estimate the e®ect of language on international trade °ows. In contrast
to this paper, Melitz's variables on language commonality do not measure the knowledge of
second languages. He only proxies the probability that two randomly chosen persons from two
di®erent countries have the same native language. My measure incorporates the two-sided
knowledge of English, French, and Chinese as ¯rst or second languages between Canadian
provinces. The empirical evidence presented in section 3 indicates that this measure is a
better proxy for the language-trade link. Moreover, Melitz focuses on the total volume of
trade, not on speci¯c industries. So he cannot attribute the estimated language e®ects to a
channel through which language erects a trade barrier.
My results suggest that commerce in industries that require direct communication for
trade increases with the probability that people in another Canadian province speak the same
language. I cannot ¯nd evidence for an impact of indirect communication via mail on intra-
Canadian trade °ows.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 the estimation equation
is motivated. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, the baseline results are discussed. In
section 5, I control for potential endogeneity. Section 6 consists of robustness checks. Finally,
section 7 wraps up the discussion. A detailed description of the variable labels is provided in
the appendix.
2 Empirical Model
While there is strong support for the language barrier in empirical research, hardly any the-
oretical work has analyzed this issue, probably because it seems self-evident that people can
only trade if they are able to communicate with each other. Yet the case for language in
trade is not clear-cut: For instance, while rice or oil can be bought at the merchandise ex-
change without the need to learn any Asian or Arabic languages, a buyer of a laptop in
2Quebec will require explanations, software, and support services in French. To see exactly
how language can a®ect trade patterns, imagine the following scenario: There are two regions,
whose populations speak di®erent languages. Translation is costly. If some products require
more communication between buyer and seller for trade to proceed, translation cost will more
adversely a®ect trade in those products. If more people learn the other's language, total
translation cost will fall. Hence, I propose the following hypothesis: ceteris paribus, a high
language commonality between two regions should disproportionately help communication-
intensive industries to trade.
With respect to the type of communication used, I distinguish between direct or spo-
ken communication and indirect or written communication. I expect direct communication
to have a larger e®ect on the volume of trade than indirect communication: Assume there
are two communication-intensive industries, one of which requires spoken communication,
whereas the other industry has a large need to exchange written documents in order to trade.
While direct communication has to occur simultaneously between two individuals, indirect
communication often requires not more than a one-time service like translating catalogs, ad-
vertisements, or letter templates. Thus total translation cost will be higher in the case of
direct communication. Hence, direct communication-intensive industries are more likely to be
a®ected by the language barrier.
In order to thoroughly test my hypotheses, I diverge from the standard gravity framework
in two important ways: First, I study the impact of language di®erences on trade within one
country only, which limits bias of the language estimates from other institutional di®erences,
such as legal, historical or social ties. This downweights the possibility that my language
estimates capture some home bias (or border) e®ects that are well-known to the international
trade literature.2 Second, the estimation equation includes ¯xed-e®ects for each bilateral pair-
ing of Canadian provinces and territories as well as ¯xed-industry e®ects. Thus the estimates
will only pick-up variation between industries and province pairings, thereby taking out het-
erogeneity that is unrelated to the potential language-trade channel I seek to identify.
This paper focuses on Canada, which is the only OECD country with more than one
o±cial language for which detailed inter-regional data on trade °ows is available. While this
choice limits the scope of the study and the number of potential sources of language varia-
tion, it o®ers at least three advantages. Firstly, the relative uniformity of Canada's legal and
social system alleviates institutional bias that is possibly present in studies of international
trade. As communication-intensive industries are often contract-intensive as well, estimates
from cross-country regressions would be likely to incorporate e®ects of comparative advan-
tage in regions with sound legal institutions (Nunn, 2007). Secondly, recent research points
out that the caveat of taking up border e®ects is signi¯cantly lower in intra-national trade.
2See McCullum (1995), Helliwell (1996), Anderson and van Windcoop (2003).
3Hummels and Hillberry (2003) showed that intra-US trade is unlikely to su®er from intra-
national border e®ects.3 Similarly, Combes et al. (2003) estimate that in France more than
60% of the potential intra-national home bias can be explained by internal migration and
cultural networks. Such network e®ects between Canadian provinces and territories are likely
to be primarily determined by linguistic di®erences, since Helliwell (1997) already pointed out
that internal migration has little trade creating e®ect within Canada. Finally, the arguments
presented above for the existence of a language-trade channel should be mainly relevant for
service-intensive industries. Therefore I refrain from studying intra-European trade (which
otherwise would make a perfect case for the language-trade link), because services are not suf-
¯ciently liberalized across EU members (e.g. Kox and Lejour, 2005; Kox and Lejour, 2006).
This paper introduces a new way to thinking about the gravity model of trade that rests
on the work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Romalis (2004), and Nunn (2007). These papers
use industry- and cross-country-variation to identify sources of a country's comparative ad-
vantage across industries. I adapt their approach for a single country setting, where I exploit
trade variation across industries and bilateral province pairings. Speci¯cally, I eliminate any
variation, which is not needed to test the main hypothesis: trade in communication-intensive
industries is higher between provinces with a higher language commonality. The model I
estimate is then:
lntradeijk = ±ij + ±k + ¯1 ln(transkdistij) + ¯2prodijk + ¯3cklangij + ²ijk; (1)
where lntradeijk is the natural logarithm of the bilateral trade °ow from province i to province
j in industry k. The ¯xed-bilateral e®ects ±ij take up all trade variation for each country pair-
ing that is constant across industries. Similarly, ±k are industry ¯xed-e®ects that are constant
across bilateral trade °ows. Compared to the traditional gravity model, the bilateral ¯xed-
e®ects do not allow using variables that are constant across country pairings. Thus, the impact
of distance on trade is proxied with the log of the interaction between the transport-intensity





GDPj re°ects di®erences in the structure of production
between two provinces. The main variable of interest is the interaction of ck and langij, in
which ck re°ects the need for communication and langij stands for the language commonality
between two provinces. ²ijk is a random error. As common in the literature (e.g. Anderson
and van Windcoop, 2003; Melitz, 2008), I assume that imports and exports are a®ected sym-
metrically by the interaction e®ects.
The approach here is conceptually di®erent from industry-level gravity models that esti-
mate the semi-elasticity of the language commonality with respect to trade (e.g. Deardor®,
3Hummels and Hillberry (2003) showed that Wolf's (2000) dataset does not properly account for intra-US
trade distances and wholesale trade °ows.
41998; Hummels, 2001). The bilateral ¯xed-e®ects capture the direct e®ect of the language
commonality on the volume of trade in my estimation equation. Hence, the coe±cient of
interest ¯3 only captures the e®ect that language commonality has on the pattern of trade
and provides no direct interpretation as a semi-elasticity of the language barrier.
The estimates of (1) should not be regarded as conclusive evidence for the language-trade
channel. First, there may be determinants of trade that are omitted from (1). As a matter of
fact Canada's English speaking provinces tend to be richer and domicile more Protestants than
Catholics compared to their French speaking counterparts. Therefore, a primary concern is
that cklangij may be simply capturing the fact that wealth and religion shape intra-Canadian
trade patterns. I carefully control for these alternative determinants of the language-trade
channel. Second, the direction of causality implied by equation (1) may be wrong. If trade
fosters the adoption of the other's language, causality might run from trade to language. In
consequence, estimates of ¯3 may be biased. In section 5, I instrument for language variation
that is una®ected by this feedback e®ect. Finally, this paper concentrates on the analysis of
positive exports and imports. Thus the interpretation of the estimates is conditional on a
province trading in an industry, thereby disregarding the e®ect of language on the decision
to enter an industry. I check for the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of zero trade in
section 6.
3 The Data
The most disaggregated inter-provincial trade data available for Canada are at the 2-digit
industry level. The data comprise all recorded (non-zero) inter-regional trade °ows of Canada's
ten provinces and three territories for the year 2001.4 The ¯nal data classify in 38 industries
that comprise agriculture, manufacturing and service industries. I study trade across all
sectors, which is di®erent from other studies that solely focus on manufacturing trade (e.g.
Nunn, 2007; Romalis, 2004; Hummels, 2001). I have numerous reasons for this approach: The
¯rst reason is that Canada's internal trade di®ers from international trade, where services
trade is negligible compared to manufactures. In 2001, service trade accounted for 56.7% of
total intra-Canadian trade °ows. The second reason is that the language channel should be
present across all sectors of the economy. Particularly, the service sector is likely to be more
language-sensitive than manufactures. So leaving out one of the sectors would narrow the
scope of this study.
4Although industry-level trade data is available from 1997 to 2004, Census data is only available for the
years 1996 and 2001. For a discussion of the derivation of inter-provincial trade °ows from IO-tables, see
G¶ en¶ ereux and Langen (2002).
5Provincial gross domestic products in current prices as well as population estimates have
been retrieved from the Statistics Canada home-page. The distance variable is from Feenstra
(2004), who provides distances between the capitals of Canadian provinces. I added distances
for each pairing that involves trade with the three territories (Northwest Territory, Nunavut,
and Yukon Territory), using the respective longitudes and latitudes.
3.1 Language Variables
In contrast to the language proxies used in previous studies, this paper measures language
commonality as the probability that any two people from di®erent provinces picked at random
will be able to communicate with each other.5 Compared to previous measures that re°ect
some aspect of language commonality, this variable is more in line with theory, because trade
requires a su±cient knowledge of the trading partner's language in order to reduce translation
cost.
The measure of language commonality between provinces is constructed from the Census
survey. The survey asks for mother tongue, knowledge of o±cial languages, and use of lan-
guages at work. Table 1 depicts the percentage of speakers of English and French as a mother
tongue in Canadian provinces. While English is the dominant mother tongue (59.5%), 22.7%
of the Canadian population are native French speakers. French mother tongue speakers, are
mainly concentrated in Quebec (81.2% French mother tongue speakers) and New Brunswick
(32.9%).
The statistics show clearly that the language barrier cannot be represented by the dis-
tribution of mother tongues within the population: 17.6% of all Canadians have a mother
tongue di®erent from the two o±cial languages. Yet only 1.5% of all Canadians are unable
to speak at least one of the two o±cial languages, which measures the real ability of people
to communicate with each other. Across provinces, only the Inuit population in the Nunavut
territories constitutes an exception with 13.1% of the population knowing neither English nor
French. While in most provinces more than 97% of the population speaks English as ¯rst or
second language, Quebec (45.4%) and New Brunswick (90.7%) are the two exceptions with
relatively few English speakers.6
In addition, I control for potential Chinese networks within Canada that have been shown
to be relevant for international trade °ows (Rauch, 2002). With 2.7%, Canada's Chinese mi-
nority supplies the third largest language group of Canada's working population. Di®erent
5For an excellent overview of language measures used in previous research, see Melitz (2008).
6Unfortunately, the data do not allow to draw explicit conclusions on the °uency of language knowledge.
Yet Hutchinson (2002) cannot ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant di®erence between speakers of English as a mother
tongue or second language, when analyzing the volume of US exports and imports.
6from other minorities, 42% of speakers with a 0Chinese0 mother tongue also use non-o±cial
languages often or sometimes at work, as table 2 shows. No other language group uses non-
native languages at work so frequently. As I analyze the language knowledge across the
total population, I use the population share with Chinese origin as a proxy for knowledge of
0Chinese0.








where l = fEnglish;French;0 Chinese0g. English is the sum of people knowing English
and people knowing English and French, divided by the total population of the province.
The French and 0Chinese0 measures are constructed similarly. langij is not bound at one,
since people may be °uent in several languages. However, I restrict the probability that two
randomly chosen people are able to communicate with each other to one in cases, where I
calculate values slightly larger than one. Based on equation (2), I also construct a measure for
religious (denominational) commonality, where l=fAnglicans, Baptists, Buddhists, Catholics,
Hindus, Jews, Muslims, United churchg.
Table 3 depicts the resulting language commonality for all bilateral country pairings.
The pairings range from Quebec and Nunavut, where the probability that two randomly
chosen people understand each other is 43.1%, to Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island,
where everybody speaks the same language. Virtually all variation in language knowledge
comes from the two French speaking provinces and the territories, whereas the pairing On-
tario/British Columbia exhibits the lowest language commonality (0.962) among the English
speaking provinces.
3.2 Communication-intensities of Industries
My argument hinges on a careful choice of ck, the proxy for di®erences in the industry-speci¯c
need of direct and indirect communication between importer and exporter. Rauch (1999)
classi¯es manufacturing goods on whether they are traded on an exchange, reference priced or
neither of both. However, I refrain from using his classi¯cation for two reasons. Firstly, it only
captures manufacturing goods, yet the services sector is an important pillar of intra-Canadian
trade that accounts for much of the language-related variation, as will be seen below. Sec-
ondly, it is not possible to extend his classi¯cation to services, because services are typically
neither reference priced nor traded on exchanges. Nonetheless, it is of particular interest to
have a measure that proxies the language-intensity of services trade, because service provision
often depends on face-to-face communication with the importer, which bears high translation
7cost if agents speak di®erent languages.7
Therefore, I construct a new measure for the communication-intensity of industries that
takes advantage of detailed input output (IO) tables. IO data are available for the manu-
facturing as well as the service sector and allow me to rank all industries according to their
need for communication between trading partners. Thereby I implicitly assume that the input
structure of communication services proxies the need for direct and indirect communication
between exporter and importer. Given the relatively high level of aggregation of the trade
data, all this assumption postulates is that if the printing industry needs a larger share of
communication inputs than the paper industry relative to its total inputs, trading printing
products also requires more communication for trade. I measure the direct communication-
intensity by the share of telecommunications services in total inputs for each industry. The
Indirect communication-intensity is measured by the input share of postal services. Since the
IO tables at M-level aggregation (2-digit level) exist only for Canada as a whole, I assume
that the average Canadian input structure persists across provinces. This strong assumption
is less problematic in the Canadian case, where production structures are relatively similar,
than in cross-country studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Nunn, 2007).
The resulting ranking seems reasonable by common sense, as can be seen in table 4. The
share of telecommunication inputs ranges from 0.05% (Fishery) to 5.3% (Professional ser-
vices). As expected, table 4 shows that service industries are more communication-intensive
than manufacturing industries. Among manufacturing industries, more complex products are
generally ranked higher, which is consistent with the Rauch (1999) classi¯cation, where more
complex manufactures such as electronic equipment are rarely reference-priced or traded on
an exchange. With respect to postal service inputs, the basic pattern persists that services are
more communication-intensive that manufactures. Yet there is variation between the relative
ranking of industries within each sector.
Finally, industries are ranked according to their relative cost of transportation, presup-
posing that distance has a larger trade diverting impact on industries with higher transport
cost. I calculate the share of transport margins in total inputs, which is de¯ned as the charges
paid to a third part in order to deliver a product from the producer to the (intermediate or
¯nal) purchaser. The ranking of the transport variable in table 4 shows that services generally
have lower transportation cost than manufactures. Particularly heavy industries rank high,
e.g. metal, mineral products, chemical, and motor vehicle industries.
7Experiments with the Rauch data proved inconclusive. I manually matched classi¯cations and calculated
the percentage of goods that are neither reference priced nor traded on public exchanges for each manufac-
turing industry. However, the estimated e®ects are only signi¯cant if trade °ows in the (language-insensitive)
petroleum and coal industries are included in the sample. This result supports the idea that translation cost
are negligible in Canadian manufacturing trade. Similarly, Rauch (2002) ¯nds no signi¯cant trade-deterring
e®ect of language on trade in di®erentiated manufacturing goods at the international level.
8Summary statistics are presented in table 5. As all interactions are obtained from the
multiplication of two shares, their actual values are very low. It is therefore impossible to
interpret the estimates of ¯3 directly.
Table 6 reports cross-correlations of the interaction terms. The high correlation between
most variables imposes a potential multicollinearity problem, which could in°ate t-statistics.
To alleviate such problems, I avoid to lump all variables together in one regression, and run
separate regressions for each variable of interest in section 6.
If not otherwise indicated, I drop the fuel as well as the petroleum and coal industries
from the sample. As these industries are unlikely to be very language-sensitive, the high trade
volumes in both industries could bias the estimates downward.
4 Empirical Results
Before the regression results are discussed, I will present some graphical evidence that supports
the choice of the functional form. Figure 1 displays non-parametric regressions of equation
(1), using the multivariate scatter plot smoother by Royston and Cox (2005). The Royston
and Cox algorithm smoothes non-parametric estimates for each independent variable condi-
tional on the other independent variables. Because these locally smoothed estimates require
no assumptions about the functional form of the relationship, this method provides a check
for the speci¯cation of equation (1).
The left part of ¯gure 1 plots the partial e®ect of telecomklangij against the logarithm of
the volume of trade. The estimates are conditional on production di®erentials, the distance
measure, bilateral and industry-¯xed-e®ects as well as the interaction between language and
postal services. The ¯gure indicates that the non-parametric estimates are su±ciently linear
to justify the choice of the functional form in (1). Also, the predictive power of the partial
estimate is relatively high, as the tight con¯dence intervals show. The ¯gure shows that trade
increases in the interaction between language commonality and the direct communication
measure. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that common language has a more pro-
nounced e®ect on communication-intensive industries. Since all observations to the right of
0.0083 on the horizontal axis belong to services industries, the graph also indicates that most
language-related variation in Canadian trade stems from service industries.
Similarly, the right part of ¯gure 1 displays non-parametric estimates of the postal ser-
vices interaction from the same regression. The graph shows that the volume of trade is
straightly decreasing in the interaction of language with the indirect communication proxy.
Because these estimates are conditional on the inclusion of the telecommunication-language
interaction, the ¯gure indicates that the partial e®ect of indirect communication on trade is
9potentially negative.
Parametric estimates of equation (1) are reported in table 7. Each model has a R2
of more than 0.40. The high explanatory power of the models is also re°ected in large F-
statistics. As expected, the transport-distance interaction has a signi¯cant negative impact
on inter-provincial trade in all models. The intuition for this estimate is that trade with
distant provinces is particularly low for transport-intensive industries.
In accordance with standard trade theory I ¯nd that specialization a®ects trade posi-
tively. The estimate implies an average impact of prodijk on trade of 39%, given the standard
deviation of 0.045 of the production di®erential within an industry.8
In column (1), the interaction between language commonality and direct communication
is statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. When shifting from the 25th to the 75th percentile
of the distribution of langij, this implies an increase of trade volume by 2.64% for an average
communication-intensive industry. For a service-intensive industry such as health, this e®ect
would correspond to an increase of trade by 6.91%.9 There is, however, less evidence for the
presence of an indirect communication channel. The postklangij variable in column (2) is sta-
tistically and economically insigni¯cant. Only when both interactions are included together
as in column (3), postklangij becomes signi¯cant. This could be due the high correlation
between postk and telecomk that blows up test statistics. The estimated partial impact of
telecomklangij nearly doubles. This indicates that industries that rely on direct interaction
in order export their products trade more between areas with a high language commonality.
On the other hand, I now estimate a signi¯cantly negative partial e®ect of the postal services
interaction on trade. While the signi¯cance of this e®ect should be interpreted with great
care due to potential multicollinearity problems, one can say that the evidence for an indirect
communication channel via mail is less conclusive.
The estimates of ¯3 might be biased if determinants of trade have been omitted from (1)
that are correlated with the explanatory variables. Warren (2003) argues that the economic
development of the French speaking provinces was retarded. Within Quebec most businesses
were in the hands of an English speaking minority before strong French-promoting legislation
was passed in the 1970s. If Canada's English speaking population were more a²uent, all
I capture with the language interaction would be a wealth e®ect. Hence, I control for the
interaction between telecommunication and joint provincial GDP per capita in column (4).
The insigni¯cance of the estimate and the fact that the estimated ¯3 remains practically un-
changed indicate that I am really capturing language e®ects.
Another reason for bias of ¯3 could be that other institutional variables that are correlated
8I calculated the e®ect as %¢tradeijk = 100 ¤ ^ ¯2 ¤ 0:045 = 100 ¤ 8:647 ¤ 0:045 = 38:91%.
9These numbers have been calculated for the pairings NL-NU (25th percentile) and ON-PE (75th percentile),
where the e®ect for an average industry is %¢tradeijk = 100 ¤ ^ ¯3 ¤ telecomijk ¤ (lang75
ij ¡ lang25
ij ) = 100 ¤
20:23 ¤ 0:0107 ¤ (0:989 ¡ 0:868).
10with language have been omitted from equation (1). It could be that the foremost Catholic
population in French-speaking Canada distrusts Protestant business partners or exhibits dif-
ferent demand patterns. If this were the case, the alleged language e®ect would really capture
religious a±liation. Although Lipset (1990) argues that religion has a smaller role in Canadian
everyday life than in the US, religious commonality has been shown to a®ect international
trade patterns (e.g. Lewer and van den Berg, 2007; Helble, 2007). Hence, I control for the
probability that two randomly chosen people from two states have the same denomination.
The religion measure is highly correlated with language commonality (0.72). Yet the estimate
in column (5) is insigni¯cant, while ¯3 remains a signi¯cant determinant of trade. The fact
that the estimate still is of similar magnitude is evidence in favor of the language channel.10
5 IV Results
Although the approach taken here reduces several potential sources of bias that are present
in standard gravity models, the estimate of ¯3 could still be subject to endogeneity. I deal
with this issue using legal language status as an instrumental variable (IV).
While Canada's O±cial Language Act of 1969 guarantees equal legal status of both
English and French with respect to federal administrative services, federal courts, and in
Parliament, some provinces enacted additional language laws. Particularly, Quebec and New
Brunswick passed own o±cial language acts during the 1970s that promote the use of French
at the work place, in educational institutions, and for administrative procedures. The O±cial
Languages of New Brunswick Act was ¯rst enacted in 1973 and later on revised. Likewise,
Amendment 16.1 of the Canadian constitution, which was enacted in 1993, reinforces the
equal status of the French language in New Brunswick. Quebec passed the O±cial Language
Act (Bill 22) in 1974 and the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) in 1977. Warren
(2003) argues that these laws triggered a revival of the French language in everyday life and
also in business, where English was to become the primary language in the 1970s. Lazear
(1999) shows that the protection of minority interests by the government reduces incentives
to learn the majority language, implying lower knowledge of English in those regions that
guarantee speci¯c language rights.
Therefore I use the legal language status across provinces as an instrument for the prob-
ability that two people from two provinces speak the same language. In particular, I use the
10Another variable that could be correlated with language commonality is ethnic origin. However, the data
do not allow to disentangle ethnic origin and language ties for French Canadians, because most Canadian
Catholics are also Qu¶ ebecois. Similarly, constructing an aggregate measure along the lines of equation (2) will
not yield a consistent proxy for ethnicity, because large ethnic groups within Canada have ethnic origins that
are unlikely to a®ect trading patterns, e.g. English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh.
11interaction cklegalij as an instrument for cklangij, where ck is assumed to be exogenous. As
legal language status is predetermined and una®ected by the trade °ow in 2001, it is a suitable
instrument to isolate exogenous variation in language commonality. The variable legalij is a
dummy, which is one if Quebec or New Brunswick are a trading partner in a bilateral pairing,
two for trade °ows between these two provinces, and zero otherwise.
The IV estimates are reported in table 8. I only report second stage estimates. The
statistics from the ¯rst stage regressions indicate that the IV estimator can be used. Columns
(1)-(4) report large F statistics and high partial R2s of the ¯rst stage regressions. Also, the in-
strument cklegalij is signi¯cantly partially correlated with cklangij in the ¯rst stage regression.
The IV estimate of langijtelecomk in (1) is positive and statistically signi¯cant, supporting the
hypothesis of a language-trade channel. However, the estimate is larger than the OLS estimate
in table 7, not smaller, as the potential reverse causality suggests. This could indicate a weak
instrument, yet neither the partial correlations, nor the t-statistic suggest presence of a weak
correlation. The Cragg and Donald (1993) test for weak instruments rejects the hypothesis
that the equation is only weakly identi¯ed. To test for local average treatment e®ects, I drop
the three territories from the sample, since they are partly inhabited by natives. This reduces
much of the language variation that cannot be attributed to laws a±rming the use of French
in business. The estimate in (2) decreases to a value 23.91 which is close to the OLS estimates.
This corresponds to an increase of trade in the health industry by 0.26% if langij increases
by 1%.11 Column (3) reports that indirect communication is not signi¯cantly related to the
volume of trade, which is in line with the estimates from the ¯xed-e®ects regressions. I also
compare the importance of indirect and direct communication in column (4). Instrumenting
for both interaction terms and dropping the territories, the estimates con¯rm that language
a®ects trade only in those industries with a high share of direct communication inputs.
6 Robustness
The following section tests the sensitivity of my results to the choice of the sample and po-
tential bias of the estimates due to the focus on positive trade °ows. Table 9 reports the
sensitivity of the estimated coe±cients to the removal of in°uential observations and the
choice of the language variable. The estimates of ¯3 are obtained from separate regressions
of equation (1), using one interaction term in each run. The upper half of table 9 reports
coe±cients for the interactions between direct communication-intensities in each industry and
language commonalities. The bottom of the table reports interactions for indirect communi-
11The calculation of the partial derivative with respect to langij yields:
@ lntradeijk
@langij = ^ ¯3 ¤ telecomk =
23:91 ¤ 0:0107 = 0:26.
12cation intensities.
As a ¯rst robustness check, I estimate equation (1) with the full sample, including the
fuel and coal and petroleum industries. Unsurprisingly, this reduces the estimate slightly,
because both industries are unlikely to be a®ected by language di®erences. Then I examine
if the estimates change if I drop all trade °ows with the three territories from the sample.
Yet the estimate for inter-provincial trade is of similar size. As a ¯nal test, I consider if my
results re°ect a mere one-o® e®ect for the year 2001. Using 1998 trade, GDP, IO data, as
well as Census data on language and ethnicity variables from 1996, I can con¯rm that the
language-trade e®ects are statistically signi¯cant and of similar size.
As a second robustness check, I run the above regressions with an alternative proxy for
language commonality. While langij proxies the potential for communication in the total
population of two provinces, I use the probability that two randomly chosen people from two
province use the same o±cial language at work as an alternative measure. This measure would
be preferred if one wants to account for the importance of language in business networks. Due
to data availability, the measure workij can only be constructed for 2001. workij and langij
are highly correlated. Table 9 reports that the estimates are statistically signi¯cant and of
similar size in all samples. Overall, the robustness checks support the preceding ¯xed-e®ects
and IV results: The telecommunication interactions are statistically signi¯cant in all models,
whereas a higher language commonality has no signi¯cant impact on trade in postal service-
intensive sectors. Hence, intra-Canadian trade patterns reveal a language-trade channel in
industries that depend on direct rather than indirect communication.
Finally, I test if the above analysis is sensitive to the exclusion of zero trade °ows from
the sample. In order to account for these, I set all observations for which trade °ows are not
reported to zero. A log-transformation of zero values is not possible, but several methods have
been suggested to deal with this issue. Sample selection procedures would probably be the
most elegant way to adjust the estimates for zero observations. However, the estimation of
sample selection models requires that at least one independent variable explains the selection
process but is not partially correlated with the dependent variable (in order not to rely on
distributional assumptions). While such exclusion restrictions can be justi¯ed for interna-
tional trade °ows (Helpman et al., 2008), it is hardly possible to ¯nd such variables for the
intra-country trade data used here.
To get around the selection problem, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggest the use of the
Poisson model for gravity equations. The Poisson estimator uses all positive and zero observa-
tions in a way that allows to interpret the coe±cients similar to gravity estimates. Although
it is typically used for count data, the Poisson estimator is consistent as long as the mean
function is correctly speci¯ed. Helpman et al. (2008) con¯rm that the Poisson method yields
similar estimates as their generalized gravity equation, which employs a two-stage procedure
13to account for the intensive and extensive margin of trade.
While most Poisson estimates in table 10 are of similar size as the ¯xed-e®ects estimates,
the inclusion of zero trade °ows has a strong e®ect on the distance estimate. The estimated
trade barrier of distance is more than twice as large. This indicates that the predominant
reason not to enter a trade relationship with another province is transport cost. Columns
(1) and (2) report regression results for all possible provinces-industries combinations. The
estimates of the interaction terms are of similar magnitude as the ¯xed-e®ects estimates. In
columns (2) and (4), I drop the fuel as well as the petroleum and coal industries from the
sample. Now the magnitude of the language interactions resembles the IV estimates from
table 9. Hence, the Poisson regressions indicate that language di®erences impact the intensive
margin of trade between Canadian provinces and territories rather than the extensive margin.
The decision to enter into trade relations with another province seems to be primarily driven
by transport cost considerations.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I identify one mechanism that could justify the empirical evidence for the lan-
guage barrier to trade in gravity models. I argue that language commonality should dispro-
portionately foster trade in industries requiring more direct communication with the importer
in order to trade, if high translation cost erect trade barriers.
To test for the existence of such a mechanism, this paper breaks new ground in the
empirical trade literature. Firstly, it focuses on a single country, Canada, to test for language-
induced di®erences in intra-industry trade. This reduces bias from other institutions that is
potentially present in cross-country studies. Secondly, I deviate from standard gravity models
by introducing bilateral ¯xed-e®ects and industry ¯xed-e®ects, thereby eliminating all varia-
tion that does not contribute to identify the proposed language channel of trade. Finally, I am
able to control for potential endogeneity within the language-trade channel, using exogenous
variation of the legal language status within Canadian provinces.
The ¯ndings support the proposed language-trade mechanism. The language barrier is
larger for industries, which require more direct communication in order to trade their prod-
ucts. Particularly service industries trade more between provinces with a high proportion of
same-language speakers. Moreover, the language channel appears to depend on direct (spo-
ken) communication rather than indirect communication by mail. This is in line with Fink et
al. (2005), who demonstrate the importance of international calling prices for the volume of
bilateral trade. Finally, the signi¯cant negative relationship between the volume of trade and
the distance-transport cost interaction holds potential for future applications of this method-
14ology.
Future research might study in how far the language-trade channel also applies to in-
ternational trade °ows. It is likely that language will prove to be mainly an impediment to
services trade and trade in complex goods that require direct communication with the foreign
importer. If this were the case, language could turn out to be a source of comparative advan-
tage that allows countries with a higher language commonality to specialize in more advanced
goods and services.
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20Table 2: TOP 20 Non-O±cial Languages Used at Work, 2001
Mother tongue Non-O±cial Share of






















Note: 'Chinese' is the sum of speakers with a mother tongue that
is Cantonese, Mandarin, or Chinese (not otherwise speci¯ed). The
data are from the 2001 census.
21Table 3: Bilateral Language Commonality, 2001
langij Exporter Importer Mean Trade Mean Exports Mean Imports
0.431 QC NU 3.56 4.25 0.95
0.492 QC NL 24.57 30.49 18.31
0.501 SK QC 29.64 21.05 37.96
0.509 QC BC 91.80 111.13 71.30
0.515 QC AB 112.26 122.93 101.59
0.530 QC NT 5.64 6.79 2.09
0.539 QC MB 42.85 40.31 45.72
0.549 QC NS 41.98 51.03 32.09
0.550 YT QC 1.20 0.60 1.41
0.557 QC ON 838.45 774.08 901.12
0.568 QC PE 7.26 8.69 5.45
0.804 NU NB 0.49 0.10 0.62
0.822 QC NB 64.18 64.05 64.32
0.847 NU BC 1.35 0.68 1.55
0.851 ON NU 4.13 4.86 1.70
0.861 NU AB 3.21 0.95 3.94
0.861 NU NT 2.99 1.03 4.95
0.863 NU MB 0.81 0.50 0.92
0.867 SK NU 0.33 0.34 0.24
0.868 YT NU 0.95 1.78 0.13
0.868 NU NL 0.34 0.25 0.37
0.870 NU NS 1.01 0.34 1.28
0.872 PE NU 0.30 0.20 0.60
0.913 NB BC 5.38 5.17 5.59
0.924 NL NB 17.05 20.65 13.79
0.926 SK NB 1.83 1.65 2.03
0.927 NB AB 5.83 4.92 6.73
0.934 NT NB 1.23 0.20 1.43
0.938 ON NB 61.90 86.32 35.27
0.939 NB MB 3.11 3.00 3.22
0.948 YT NB 0.58 0.15 0.65
0.949 NS NB 32.15 31.90 32.38
0.958 PE NB 8.84 6.42 11.05
0.962 ON BC 276.05 373.43 175.81
0.968 NT BC 8.71 15.03 5.65
0.970 BC AB 230.30 226.31 234.39
0.971 MB BC 30.89 34.11 27.77
0.974 SK BC 32.15 28.39 35.91
0.974 NL BC 3.73 2.47 4.55
0.975 ON AB 410.28 463.42 355.57
0.975 ON NT 18.92 13.35 34.68
0.977 YT BC 6.02 7.51 5.07
0.978 NS BC 7.86 6.94 8.77
0.978 ON MB 120.77 135.62 104.65
0.979 SK ON 108.92 92.42 126.39
0.979 ON NL 52.53 68.39 35.14
0.980 PE BC 1.13 0.62 1.46
0.984 NT AB 9.57 2.61 13.49
0.984 YT ON 4.02 2.40 4.60
0.986 ON NS 81.28 109.05 50.91
0.986 MB AB 78.38 67.17 88.96
0.987 NT MB 1.50 0.82 1.76
0.989 SK AB 110.14 85.05 135.23
0.989 PE ON 14.67 9.64 18.17
0.989 SK NT 0.83 0.85 0.78
0.990 NL AB 8.42 2.70 12.30
0.991 NT NL 0.39 0.23 0.44
0.992 SK MB 36.57 35.92 37.31
0.992 YT AB 2.90 1.28 3.60
0.993 NL MB 1.91 1.37 2.20
0.993 YT NT 1.21 2.25 0.28
0.994 NS AB 11.27 10.11 12.36
0.995 NS NT 1.84 2.64 0.34
0.996 YT MB 0.42 0.41 0.42
0.996 PE AB 1.29 1.14 1.39
0.997 SK NL 1.39 1.45 1.27
0.997 YT SK 0.29 0.33 0.28
0.998 PE NT 0.23 0.23 0.20
0.998 NS MB 4.12 3.86 4.38
0.998 YT NL 0.10 0.05 0.11
1.000 SK NS 3.07 2.97 3.18
1.000 PE MB 0.95 1.27 0.74
1.000 PE NL 1.98 2.58 1.43
1.000 NS NL 15.29 19.88 10.84
1.000 YT NS 0.29 0.13 0.36
1.000 PE NS 7.54 5.20 9.80
1.000 YT PE 0.20 - 0.20
1.000 SK PE 0.52 0.63 0.36
Note: Trade is the average bilateral trade across all reported industries in million
Canadian $. langij is the probability that two randomly selected people from
both regions are able to communicate with each other in English, French, or
'Chinese'. Own calculations.Table 4: Input Shares by Sector, 2001
Industry Trade Telecoms services Postal Services Transport Services
in million $ in % in % in %
Fishery 6.78 0.05 - 0.68
Metal 90.31 0.07 0.02 2.18
Paper 60.41 0.09 0.05 3.94
Petroleum and Coal 102.60 0.09 0.01 0.59
Fuels 680.76 0.10 0.03 0.11
Lumber and Wood 35.25 0.14 0.04 2.14
Beverages and Tobacco 17.75 0.15 0.07 0.76
Residential Construction 74.65 0.15 0.07 0.76
Leather 29.74 0.19 0.19 0.94
Textiles 22.58 0.19 0.15 0.54
Hosiery 29.27 0.22 0.25 0.26
Fabricated Metal 50.42 0.22 0.11 1.48
Furniture 27.18 0.23 0.21 1.09
Mineral products 16.89 0.24 0.11 2.58
Minerals 8.48 0.24 0.08 0.70
Ores 77.29 0.24 0.08 0.70
Machinery 31.58 0.27 0.12 0.90
Motor vehicles, parts 93.38 0.27 0.14 1.84
Print 34.58 0.28 0.33 1.41
Manufactured Products 28.69 0.37 0.39 0.70
Accommodation and Meals 26.22 0.37 0.07 0.51
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 94.92 0.38 0.22 2.33
Forestry 26.02 0.40 0.04 0.20
Mining services 17.71 0.44 0.06 0.81
Electronic equipment 48.16 0.57 0.20 1.27
Grains 27.53 0.63 0.00 1.05
Fruits 82.46 0.63 0.00 1.05
Meat 88.13 0.63 0.00 1.05
other Agriculture 59.06 0.83 0.05 1.50
Retail 25.63 1.01 1.87 0.07
Finance and Insurance 143.51 1.07 0.56 0.02
Utilities 43.39 1.13 0.68 1.01
Educational services 3.32 1.41 0.71 0.05
Wholesale 140.05 2.27 1.08 0.13
Communication services 45.52 2.43 5.17 0.11
Health 3.70 2.52 0.45 0.05
other Services 51.25 2.82 2.32 0.39
Transport and Storage 74.00 4.21 1.22 0.88
Professional services 152.78 5.30 2.55 0.69
Note: Trade is the average trade in this industry across all reported bilateral °ows. Telecommunication, postal, and
transportation services inputs shares are calculated as the percentage of total inputs in that industry. Own calculations.
23Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
tradeijk (incl. zeros) 31.73644 170.27857 0 4628.5 6864
lntradeijk 1.62792 2.37216 -2.30259 8.43999 3572
ln(transkdistij) 2.50666 1.39345 -3.5636 5.31714 6864
prodijk 0 0.04548 -0.34918 0.34918 5922
telecomklangij 0.00712 0.01038 0.0002 0.05304 6552
postklangij 0.00436 0.00868 0 0.05165 6396
telecomkworkij 0.00695 0.01026 0.00017 0.0528 6552
postkworkij 0.00426 0.00856 0 0.05142 6396
telecomkGDPpcij 0.00001 0.00002 0 0.00021 6552
telecomkreligionij 0.00148 0.00258 0.00002 0.02806 6552
Table 6: Cross-correlation table
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 ln(tradeijk) 1.00
2 ln(distij ¤ transk) -0.08 1.00
3 prodijk 0.11 0.05 1.00
4 telecomk ¤ langij 0.02 -0.24 -0.02 1.00
5 postk ¤ langij -0.03 -0.33 -0.03 0.65 1.00
6 telecomk ¤ workij 0.01 -0.23 -0.02 0.99 0.65 1.00
7 postk ¤ workij -0.04 -0.32 -0.03 0.65 0.99 0.66 1.00
8 telecomk ¤ GDPpcij 0.01 -0.18 -0.01 0.84 0.55 0.84 0.55 1.00
9 telecomk ¤ religionij 0.02 -0.25 0.02 0.72 0.46 0.69 0.45 0.64 1.00
24Table 7: Baseline estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(transkdistij) -0.409*** -0.415*** -0.413*** -0.409*** -0.409***
(0.119) (0.123) (0.123) (0.119) (0.119)
prodijk 8.647*** 7.854*** 7.862*** 8.646*** 8.647***
(0.965) (0.933) (0.932) (0.967) (0.965)
telecomklangij 20.23** 36.67*** 20.12** 20.22*







Observations 3330 3261 3261 3330 3330
F-statistic 60.71 63.91 62.75 59.18 59.14
R2 0.412 0.411 0.413 0.412 0.412
Note: Note: The estimates are from ¯xed-e®ects regressions of equation (1). The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of bilateral trade between provinces i and j. All speci¯-
cations include ¯xed-bilateral and -industry e®ects. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
25Table 8: Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(transkdistij) 2.034** 1.259 -0.0801 0.903
(0.993) (1.020) (1.024) (1.150)
prodijk 8.657*** 9.591*** 7.858*** 8.591***
(0.895) (0.896) (0.865) (0.852)




Observations 3327 2554 3258 2492
F-stat 62.76 80.94 63.18 79.13
Craag-Donald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(p-value)
R2 0.411 0.492 0.410 0.501
1st-stage F statistic 184.6 155.3 95.04
(telecomklangij)
1st-stage partial R2 0.435 0.423 0.424
(telecomklangij)
1st-stage F statistic 103.4 92.53
(postklangij)
1st-stage partial R2 0.434 0.423
(postklangij)
Note: The estimates are from ¯xed-e®ects instrumental variables regres-
sions of equation (1). The dependent variable is the bilateral trade between
provinces i and j. All speci¯cations include ¯xed-bilateral and -industry
e®ects. In Columns (2) and (4), the sample is restricted to Canada's ten
provinces. The Craag and Donald (1993) statistic tests the null hypothesis
that the model is weakly identi¯ed. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels.
26Table 9: Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
Full sample Only Provinces 1998 sample
Telecommunication services













Note: The regressions are estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of bilateral trade between provinces i and j. All speci¯cations include ¯xed-
bilateral and -industry e®ects. Each entry of the table reports the estimated coe±cients
for ¯3 with robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Below this the number of
observations in the regression is reported. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The full sample includes also the following sectors: Fuels,
Petroleum and Coal.
27Table 10: Robustness to zeros: Poisson estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(transkdistij) -0.974*** -0.972*** -0.979*** -0.969***
(0.254) (0.254) (0.254) (0.254)
prodijk 7.029*** 6.916*** 7.001*** 6.831***
(1.496) (1.668) (1.494) (1.645)




Observations 5610 5466 5454 5310
Pseudo-R2 0.891 0.908 0.892 0.910
Note: The estimates are from poisson regressions of equation (1). The
dependent variable is the bilateral trade between provinces i and j.
Columns (1) and (3) use all available observations. All speci¯cations
include ¯xed-bilateral and -industry e®ects. In columns (2) and (4)
the industries Fuels, Petroleum and Coal have been dropped. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
28Table 11: Variable labels
Label Explanation
tradeijk The trade volume between province or territory i and province or territory j
in industry k in million Canadian dollars, including zero trade °ows.
lntradeijk The natural logarithm of tradeijk.
transk The share of transport margins in total inputs of industry k.
distij The bilateral distance between two capital cities of provinces or territories.
prodijk The industry di®erential in the total production of two provinces.
telecomk The share of telecommunication services in total inputs of industry k.
postk The share of postal services in total inputs of industry k.
langij The probability that two randomly chosen people from province i and j are
able to communicate with each other.
workij The probability that two randomly chosen people from province i and j use
the same o±cial language at work.
GDPpcij The joint GDP per capita of provinces i and j.
religionij The probability that two randomly chosen people from province i and j have
the same religion or denomination.
29